The Complainant in this administrative proceeding is Bradford & Bingley Plc, a United Kingdom corporation with a place of business in Bingley, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom.

The Respondent in this administrative proceeding is Registrant info@fashionID.com 987654321, with a postal mailing address listed as Registrant 31/F Dotcom House, Admiralty HK Hong Kong 852, SAR of China.

The disputed domain name is <bradfordbingley.com>. The Registrar of the domain name is OnlineNIC Inc., dba China-Channel.com.

This is a mandatory administrative proceeding submitted for decision in accordance with the Uniform Policy for Domain Name Dispute Resolution, adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on August 26, 1999 (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, approved by ICANN on October 24, 1999 (the "Rules"), and the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").

By registering the disputed domain name with the Registrar, the Respondent agreed to the resolution of disputes pursuant to the Policy and Rules.

According to the information provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center"), the history of this proceeding is as follows:

The Complainant filed its Complaint with the Center on May 29, 2002, by email and on May 31, 2002, by hardcopy.

On May 30 and 31, 2002, the Center requested and obtained from OnlineNIC Inc., the registrar of the disputed domain name, verification that the domain name is registered with OnlineNIC Inc. and the Respondent is the registrant for the domain name.

On June 4, 2002, the Center requested an amendment to the Complaint, which the Complainant filed on June 5, 2002, by email and on June 6, 2002, by hardcopy.

On June 10, 2002, having verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Policy and the Rules, the Center formally commenced this proceeding and delivered to the Respondent notice of the Complaint and commencement of this proceeding.

The Complainant filed a supplementary submission on June 19, 2002, by email and on June 26, 2002, by hardcopy.

The Respondent failed to file a Reply within the prescribed time limits or at all, and on July 1, 2002, the Center delivered a Notification of Respondent Default to the Respondent.

The single Panel member, Bradley J. Freedman, agreed to act as Panelist in this proceeding and filed the necessary Statement Of Acceptance and Declaration Of Impartiality And Independence, and on July 12, 2002, was duly appointed by the Center. Absent exceptional circumstances, the Panel was required to forward its decision to the Center by July 26, 2002.

On July 12, 2002, the Center delivered a Notification of Appointment of Administrative Panel and Projected Decision Date to the parties.

The Panel finds that it was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the Rules and the Supplemental Rules.

Based upon the information provided by the Center, the Panel finds that all technical requirements for the prosecution of this proceeding were met.

On July 25, 2002, the Panel issued a Procedural Order, pursuant to Rules paragraphs 10(b) and 12, in which the Panel invited the Complainant to provide details regarding its investigation and inquiries into the Respondent’s rights and interests, or lack thereof, in the disputed domain name and such submissions and evidence as the Complainant considered appropriate regarding those matters on or before August 1, 2002, and the Respondent was given the right to submit a reply on or before August 8, 2002. The Panel further ordered that the date for the issuance of its decision in this matter be changed to August 16, 2002.

The Complainant timely provided its further submissions. The Respondent did not provide any submissions in response to the Procedural Order. However, on July 26, 2002, the Respondent, using the email address "info@fashionid.com", sent the following email to the Center: "dear all, i decision release the domain to public!". The Center responded by advising the Respondent that the registration of the disputed domain name would not be changed until the Panel had rendered its decision.

The following information is derived from the Complaint and supporting evidence submitted by the Complainant.

The Complainant is a provider of financial and property services (mainly mortgages and savings products) in the United Kingdom. It traces its origins to Bradford Equitable and Bingley Building Society, which were both formed in the 1850s. The Complainant has over 500 branches, online services, over 800 financial advisers and a number of third party distributors. The Group has 8,000 staff and over 4 million customers.

Over 1 million customers use the Complainant’s online estate agency business and the number of unique visitors (returning visitors) a month is 100,000.

The Complainant’s total sales for the year 2000 amounted to $1,954 million. The Complainant’s marketing costs related to the BRADFORD & BINGLEY brand for the year 2001 amounted to GB £31.8 million.

The Complainant is the registered owner of the BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark under at least four registrations on the U.K. Trade Marks Registry for use in association with various wares and services, including insurance, underwriting and brokerage banking services, financial services, and related printed materials. The Complainant is the registered owner of numerous other trademarks registered on the U.K. Trade Marks Registry that incorporate the words "Bradford & Bingley".

The Complainant is also the registrant of at least 41 domain names reflecting the BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark, including <bradfordandbingley.info>, <bradfordandbingley.net>, <bradfordandbingley.org>, <bradford-bingley-group.com>, <bradford-bingleygroup.com> and <bradford-bingley.com>.

The disputed domain name was registered on March 14, 2002. The disputed domain name resolves to a website that contains a directory of sexually explicit or pornographic websites. The website content does not include the words "Bradford" or "Bingley".

The Respondent is not and has not been known commonly by the disputed domain name, and has not been authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name.

The Respondent has not filed any substantive response to the Complaint, and has not answered the Complainant’s factual assertions or evidence in any other manner.

On its own initiative, the Panel accessed the Respondent’s website using the disputed domain name[1]. The Panel discovered that when exiting the Respondent’s website a further pop-up window appears providing another list of "adult links".

The Complainant contends as follows:

(i) The Complainant is the owner of the BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark in the United Kingdom, and the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s mark.

(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Complainant is not and has not been known commonly by the disputed domain name, and has not been authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name.

(iii) The Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because: (1) the Respondent registered the disputed domain name knowing of the Complainant and its trademarks and domain names; (2) the Respondent registered the disputed domain to prevent the Complainant from doing so and in order to further various bad faith objectives, such as using the disputed domain name in order to divert Internet users to its pornographic website; (3) the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name for a pornographic website is "disrupting and sullying the Complainant's reputation and business"; (4) the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of similar conduct involving domain names that are confusing with other well known trademarks; and (5) the Respondent registered the domain name using false contact information.

As previously indicated, the Respondent has not filed any substantive response to the Complaint and has not answered the Complainant’s contentions in any other manner.

The Policy is narrow in scope. It applies only to disputes involving alleged bad faith registration and use of domain names – conduct commonly known as "cybersquatting" or "cyberpiracy". The Policy does not apply to other kinds of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The narrow scope of the Policy reflects its origins as a novel form of Internet dispute resolution designed to balance a wide range of perspectives regarding the regulation of Internet conduct[2].

The application of the Policy is limited to situations in which a complainant asserts and proves the following: (i) the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith[3]. A complainant must prove all three elements in order to be entitled to relief under the Policy[4].

The burden is on the Complainant to prove each of the three requirements elements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a). It is not sufficient for the Complainant to make assertions without providing proof[5].

(a) The Respondent’s Default

Rules paragraph 10(a) requires that the Panel ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case. Rules paragraph 14 reads as follows:

The Respondent was given notice of this proceeding in accordance with the Rules. As previously indicated, the Respondent failed to file any substantive reply to the Complaint and has not sought to answer the Complainant’s assertions, evidence or contentions in any other manner. The Respondent’s July 26, 2002, email confirms, however, that it is aware of this proceeding and has chosen not to contest the Complaint. The Panel finds that the Respondent has been given a fair opportunity to present its case, and the Panel will proceed to a decision on the Complaint.

The Respondent’s default and the Respondent’s July 26, 2002, email and instruction to release the disputed domain name to the public do not automatically result in a decision in favour of the Complainant. The Complainant must still prove each of the three elements required by Policy paragraph 4(a)[6].

Rules paragraph 15(a) provides that the Panel shall decide the Complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable. In accordance with Rules paragraph 14(b), the Panel may draw such inferences as are appropriate from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complainant’s assertions and evidence or to otherwise contest the Complaint. In the circumstances, the Panel’s decision is based upon the Complainant’s assertions and evidence and inferences drawn from the Respondent’s failure to reply[7].

The Complainant is the owner of the BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark registered in the United Kingdom, and uses that mark in association with its financial and property services in the United Kingdom. The Complainant’s assertions in this regard are supported by documentary evidence. The Respondent has not filed any substantive reply to the Complaint, and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions. In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark.

The Policy requires that the disputed domain name be "identical or confusingly similar" to the Complainant’s BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark. The Complainant asserts that the challenged domain name is confusingly similar to its trademark.

When comparing a challenged domain name and a trademark, the addition of the .com suffix is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark. Rather, one looks to the second-level domain for such a determination, since the .com suffix is merely descriptive of the registry services and is not an identifier of a source of goods or services[8].

The omission of spaces between the components of a trademark when used in a domain name does not mean that the domain name and the mark cease to be identical. The omission of spaces is simply a function of the technical limitations of domain names, and should be disregarded when determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark[9].

The ampersand symbol cannot be part of domain names for technical reasons. A number of panels have held that the absence of an ampersand symbol is not sufficient to prevent a disputed domain name from being confusingly similar to a complainant’s trademark. Other panels have noted that Internet users are aware that ampersand symbols are not used in Internet addresses, and expect that a mark that includes an ampersand will be used in a domain name either without the ampersand or with a replacement, such as the word "and"[10]. The Complainant itself has registered and uses numerous domain names that incorporate its BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademarks that either eliminate the ampersand or replace it with the word "and" or a dash.

The Policy and the Rules do not provide any guidance with respect to the test to be applied regarding the confusing similarity requirement of the Policy. Panels have applied different tests. Some panels have undertaken a literal comparison of the domain name and the trademark, and have not considered whether there is any source confusion[11]. Other panels have undertaken a source confusion analysis as required by conventional Anglo-American trademark law, which involves a consideration of all of the circumstances including the strength of the complainant’s mark, the sophistication of likely consumers, and the nature of the wares and services with which the domain name and conflicting mark are used[12].

A number of considerations support the view that the appropriate test for confusing similarity under the Policy is a literal comparison of the challenged domain name and conflicting mark:

1. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) should be interpreted in a purposive manner consistent with the Policy’s remedial nature and objective – to prevent the extortionate behaviour known as "cybersquatting".

2. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) does not invoke a likelihood of confusion test, as contrasted with Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv) which expressly refers to a "likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the registrant’s] web site or location or of a product or service on [the registrant’s] web site or location" as an indication of bad faith domain name registration and use.

3. The Policy is international and, in the absence of express language, it is inappropriate to import into Policy paragraph 4(a) a test that may not exist under all national trademark laws.

4. The procedure contemplated by the Policy is not well-suited to the kinds of difficult factual issues presented by a conventional source confusion analysis. In particular, the Policy is intended to be a relatively quick and inexpensive process, panels must make factual determinations based upon written submissions and documentary evidence, complainants have no right of reply without the panel’s permission, and parties are often not represented by counsel.

For these reasons, the Panel considers the appropriate test for confusing similarity to be a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant’s mark.

In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the first element required by the Policy.

The second element required by Policy paragraph 4(a) – the registrant has no legitimate right or interest in the domain name – requires the Complainant to prove a negative proposition, which can be particularly difficult[13].

A number of panels have held that the burden on a complainant regarding the second element is necessarily light, because the nature of the registrant’s rights or interests, if any, in the domain name lies most directly within the registrant’s knowledge[14]. Other panels have held that once the complainant makes a prima facie showing that the registrant does not have rights or legitimate interest in the domain name, the evidentiary burden shifts to the registrant to rebut the showing by providing evidence of its rights or interests in the domain name[15].

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Respondent is not and has not been known commonly by the disputed domain name, and has not been authorized by the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name. In response to the Panel’s July 26, 2002, Procedural Order, the Complainant provided evidence of various international trademark searches that indicate that the Respondent does not have any registered interest in any registered marks that include the terms "bradford" or "bingley".

The Respondent has not filed any substantive reply to the Complaint, and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions. Nevertheless, in determining whether the Complainant has met its burden regarding this required element of the Policy, it is incumbent upon the Panel to consider whether the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name demonstrates rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. According to Policy paragraph 4(c), the following circumstances, if proved, demonstrate a registrant’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name:

(i) the registrant used or demonstrably prepared to use the domain name or a corresponding name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to notice of the dispute;

(ii) the registrant (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if it has not acquired trademark rights; or

(iii) the registrant is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the complainant’s mark.

To satisfy the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i), the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name must be in connection with a "bona fide" offering of goods or services. In some circumstances a directory of sexually explicit websites may constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services. In the circumstances of this case, however, the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name is not "bona fide" within the meaning of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i) because: (a) the disputed domain name is complex and specific to the Complainant; (b) there is no apparent connection between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s website or its pornographic content; and (c) there is no other apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for its website. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name for its website.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(ii) is not applicable. The Respondent does not contend, and there is no evidence that, Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain name or that the disputed domain name is derived from one of Respondent’s trademarks or trade names.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(iii) is not applicable. The Respondent is using the domain name for an offering of services, namely a commercial directory of sexually explicit websites.

For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii) requires the Complainant to prove that the Respondent registered and has used the disputed domain name in bad faith. The language of Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) is conjunctive, and requires that both bad faith registration and bad faith use be proved[16].

"Bad faith" within the meaning of the Policy is a term of art, and is not intended to apply to distasteful conduct that might constitute bad faith in the ordinary sense of the term[17]. The use of a domain name for a pornographic website is not necessarily a bad faith use[18].

Policy paragraph 4(b) provides that the following circumstances are deemed to be evidence that a registrant has registered and used a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of its documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its Web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its Web site or location or of a product or service on its Web site or location.

The Policy expressly states that these circumstances are non-exclusive[19].

The Complainant relies upon Policy paragraph 4(b)(i), arguing that the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name gives rise to a presumption that the purpose of the domain name registration and use is to entice the Complainant to offer to purchase the domain name for valuable consideration in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name. However, there is no evidence that the Respondent ever offered to sell the disputed domain name to the Complainant or any other person. In the circumstances, the Panel is not prepared to find that Policy paragraph 4(b)(i) is applicable.

The Complainant also relies upon Policy paragraph 4(b)(ii), arguing that the Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name prevents the Complainant from reflecting its BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark in a corresponding domain name and the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct.

There is some disagreement regarding the interpretation of Policy paragraph 4(b)(ii) requirement that the domain name "prevent the complainant owner of the mark from using it in a corresponding domain name". For example, in Springsteen v. Burgar [20] the majority of the panel held that paragraph 4(b)(ii) should be read as referring to "any corresponding domain name" rather than "a particular corresponding domain name". The majority concluded that paragraph 4(b)(ii) was not implicated because the registrant’s registration of <brucespringsteen.com> and <brucespringsteen.org> did not prevent the complainant from registering <brucespringsteen.net>. That interpretation was expressly disagreed with by the panel in Julie Brown v. Julie Brown Club [21]and Celine Dion v. Bugar[22], on the basis that the registration of a trademark as a domain name in the .com gTLD prevented the trademark owners from securing "the straightforward .com registration" for their trademarks, which is "a corresponding domain name". The panel reasoned that if the <brucespringsteen.com> panel’s interpretation were correct, then the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(b)(ii) would rarely be met because a domain name corresponding to a trademark would almost always be available in one of the hundreds of country code TLDs. The Panel prefers the reasoning articulated in the Julie Brown and Celine Dion decisions, and finds that the Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name prevents the Complainant from using its BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark in a corresponding domain name.

Regarding the required pattern of similar conduct, the Complainant relies upon the registration of two other domain names – <basejam.com> and <terriwells.com>. "Base Jam" is the name of a popular Indonesian rock band. The <basejam.com> domain name was registered by the Respondent four days before the disputed domain name was registered, and now resolves to an Internet search engine. The Complainant contends that the Respondent initially used the <basejam.com> domain name for a sexually explicit website, but provided no evidence in support of that contention. Terri Welles is a former Playboy Playmate of the Year. The <terriwells.com> domain name was registered two days after the disputed domain name and resolves to the same pornographic website to which the disputed domain name resolves. The name of the registrant is "Registrant kids@m-a-i-l.com 987654321", which is not the same as the name of the Respondent, but all other registrant information is identical to the Respondent’s registrant information. In the circumstances, including the cryptic and unusual registration information provided by the Respondent in connection with the registration of the disputed domain name, the Panel finds that the Respondent is responsible for the registration and use of the <terriwells.com> domain name. The Respondent’s registration of two other domain names, both apparently incorporating trademarks of other persons and both resolving to apparently unconnected websites (a search engine and a pornographic website) are, in the absence of any explanation by the Respondent, sufficient to establish the required pattern of similar conduct. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has established the two elements required by Policy paragraph 4(b)(ii).

The Complainant also relies upon Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), which requires the Complainant to establish that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its pornography website for commercial gain. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or its BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark, or intended to use the disputed domain name to confuse and divert Internet users. Nevertheless, the Respondent’s knowledge and intention may be determined by common sense inferences from circumstantial evidence[23].

A domain name is more than a mere Internet address. It often identifies the Internet site to those who reach it, and sends a message that the site is owned by, sponsored by, affiliated with, or endorsed by the person with the name, or owning the trademark, reflected in the domain name[24].

The Panel finds that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark and registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its pornography website, based upon the following circumstances: (a) the disputed domain name is complex and specific to the Complainant; (b) there is no apparent connection between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s website or its pornographic content; (c) there is no other apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for its website; (d) the Respondent has not denied any knowledge of the Complainant or its trademark; and (e) the Respondent registered and is using the <terriwells.com> domain name for the same pornographic website. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name for its website.

The Panel also finds that the Respondent’s pornographic website results in commercial gain to the Respondent. It is well known that many pornographic websites generate revenue from click-through advertising, by directing traffic to other websites, and other online marketing techniques. In the absence of any reply by the Respondent, the Panel finds that the Respondent’s website generates revenue for the Respondent in that manner.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has established that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv).

The Complainant also contends that the Respondent has provided false contact information, and that this is an additional basis for finding that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. A number of panels have held that bad faith registration and use may be established where the registrant provides misleading contact information in its registration documents[25]. However, it appears that while the Respondent’s postal address may be incorrect, its email address is not.

The Complainant has established each of the three requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a) – the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s BRADFORD & BINGLEY trademark, the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

The Panel therefore directs that the registration of the disputed domain name be transferred from the Respondent to the Complainant.

1. This practice has been adopted by numerous panels. See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001); Two Systems Enterprises Co. Ltd. v. Sonie's Creations, Case No. AF-0911 (September 7, 2001).
2. See Quarterview v. Quarterview Co. Ltd., Case No. AF-0209(a-b) (July 6, 2000); Libro AG v. NA Global Link Limited, WIPO Case No. D 2000-0186 (May 16, 2000); Toronto Star Newspapers Limited v. Virtual Dates Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-1612 (February 6, 2001); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); FLOS Spa. v. Victory Interactive Media S.A., WIPO Case No. D2000-0771 (December 15, 2000); Re. Infolink v. Nathan Frey, WIPO Case No. D2000-1687 (March 26, 2001); Tribeca Film Center Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-Mackenzie, WIPO Case No. D2000-1772 (April 10, 2001); Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-1202 (January 2, 2001); Nintendo of America Inc. v. Alex Jones, WIPO Case No. D2000-0998 (November 17, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (November 23, 2000); Jules I. Kendall v. Mayer, WIPO Case No. D2000-0868 (October 26, 2000); and the ICANN Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, October 24, 1999, www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm, at paragraph 4.1(c).
3. Policy paragraph 4(a).
4. See Edward Van Halen v. Morgan, Case No. D2000-1313 (December 20, 2000).
5. See Radio Globo SA v. Diogo Pimentel, WIPO Case No. D2000-1705 (January 31, 2001); Two Systems Enterprises Co. Ltd. v. Sonie's Creations, Case No. AF-0911 (September 7, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001).
6. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); Cortefiel S.A. v. Quintas, WIPO Case No. D2000-0140; Shore Media Ventures Inc. v. Both Worlds Inc., Case No. AF-0228; Softquad Software Inc. v. Eleven-Eleven Ltd., Case No. AF-0143; The Estate of Tupac Shakur v. Andronian, Case No. AF0349 (October 3, 2000); Cho Yong Pil v. Dooseok, WIPO Case No. D2000-0754 (August 28, 2000); Rickey Skaggs v. Vincente, WIPO Case No. D2000-1134 (December 18, 2000); Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001).
7. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); MatchNet plc v. MAC Trading, WIPO Case No. D2000-0205; SeekAmerica Networks Inc. v. Masood , WIPO Case No. D2000-0131; The Pep Boys Manny, Moe and Jack of California v. E-Commerce Today, Ltd., Case No. AF-0145 (May 3, 2000); Bloomberg L.P. v. Baltic Consultants Ltd., Case No. FA0010000095834 (November 20, 2000); Isabelle Adjani v. Second Orbit Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0867 (October 4, 2000); Sony Corporation v. Inja, WIPO Case No. D2000-1409 (December 9, 2000); Doctor.Ing.h.c. F. Porsche AG v. Stonybrook Investments Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-1095 (October 26, 2001); Credit Suisse Group v. Milanes-Espinach, Fernando and Milanes-Espinach, SA, WIPO Case No. D2000-1376 (March 20, 2001); Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March 6, 2001); American Online Inc. v. Johuathan Investments Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0918 (September 14, 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Brown, WIPO Case No. D2001-0716 (July 18, 2001).
8. See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Denny Hammerton and The Jimi Hendrix Fan Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-0364 (August 15, 2000); VAT holding AG v. Vat.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0607 (August 22, 2000); Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Kim Jong Sub, Case No. FA01010000096377 (February 19, 2001); Rollerblade Inc. v. Chris McGrady, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429 (June 25, 2000); Nintendo of America Inc. v. Alex Jones, WIPO Case No. D2000-0998 (November 17, 2000); AltaVista Co. v. Stonybrook Investments, WIPO Case No. D2000-0886 (October 26, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000).
9. See The Pep Boys Manny, Moe and Jack of California v. E-Commerce Today, Ltd., Case No. AF-0145 (May 3, 2000); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Artco, Inc., Case No. FA0094342 (May 9, 2000); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. victoriassecret.org, Case No. FA0094349 (May 14, 2000); Hunton & Williams v. American Distribution Systems Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0501 (August 1, 2000); Micron Electronics Inc. v. Frank Holden, Case No. FA0103000096797 (April 4, 2001); Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and Trigon Insurance Company Inc. d/b/a Blue Cross Blue Shield v. InterActive Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0788 (August 28, 2000).
10. See PG&E Corporation v. Samuel Anderson and PGE in the year 2000, WIPO Case No. D2000-1264; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v. Robert Thorp, WIPO Case No. 2001-1431; TPI Holdings Inc. v. Guida, WIPO Case No. D2000-0269; AT&T Corp. v. Tala Alamuddin, WIPO Case No. D2000-0249; AT&T Corp. v. WorldclassMedia.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0553; AT&T Corp. v. Thompson, WIPO Case No. D2001-0830.
11. See Smoky Mountain Knife Works v. Deon Carpenter, Case No. AF-230 (July 3, 2000); Newport News Inc. v. VCV Internet, Case No. AF-0238 (July 18, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Richard MacLeod d/b/a For Sale, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (September 19, 2000); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation v. Sound Choice Disc Jockeys Inc., Case No. FA20002000093636 (March 13, 2000); VeriSign Inc. v. Michael Brook, WIPO Case No. D2000-1139 (March 7, 2001); Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., Case No. AF-0096 (March 16, 2000); The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Kapachev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 (January 15, 2001).
12. See Aurora Foods Inc. v. David Paul Jaros, WIPO Case No. D2000-0274 (June 7, 2000); Robert Chestnutt v. Jennifer Tumminelli, WIPO Case No. D2000-1758 (February 2, 2001); Jordan Grand Prix Limited v. Gerry Sweeney, WIPO Case No. D2000-0233 (May 11, 2000); Automatic Data Processing Inc. v. Access Electronics, Case No. FA0101000096483 (February 20, 2001); Motorola Inc. v. Newgate Internet Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0079 (April 14, 2000); America Online Inc. v. Frank Albanese, WIPO Case No. D2000-1604 (January 25, 2001). See also Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 6.
13. See Radio Globo S.A. v. Diogo Pimentel, WIPO Case No. D2000-1705 (January 31, 2001).
14. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); Grove Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. Telesystems Communications Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-0158 (May 9, 2000); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001).
15. See Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation v. Khaled Ali Soussi, WIPO Case No. D2000-0252 (July 5, 2000); Electronic Commerce Media Inc. v. Taos Mountain, Case No. FA0008000095344 (October 11, 2000); Universal City Studios Inc. v. G.A.B. Enterprises, WIPO Case No. D2000-0416 (June 29, 2000); Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (January 25, 2001); Credit Suisse Group v. Milanes-Espinach, Fernando and Milanes-Espinach, SA, WIPO Case No. D2000-1376 (March 20, 2001); See also Ingram Micro Inc. v. Noton Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0124 (March 6, 2001); Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropical Web, WIPO Case No. D2000-0624 (August 21, 2000).
16. See e-Duction Inc. v. Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1369 (February 5, 2001); World Wrestling Entertainment v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No. D99-0001 (January 14, 2000); Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. William H. Wilson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0265 (June 16, 2000); Audiopoint Inc. v. eCorp., WIPO Case No. D2001-0509 (June 14, 2001); A Prompt Corporation v. Aprompt Computers Inc., Case No. AF-00816 (June 18, 2001); A & F Trademark Inc. v. Justin Jorgensen, WIPO Case No. D2001-0900 (September 19, 2001).
17. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (November 23, 2000).
18. See Paragon Electric Co. Inc. v. Buy This Domain d/b/a/ NameRegister.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-1439 (February 20, 2002).
19. See Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (February 18, 2000); The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. DR Seagle t/a Mr. Oxford-University, WIPO Case No. D2001-0746 (August 14, 2001); The Bruce Trail Association v. Andrew Camp and Bruce Trail Employees, WIPO Case No. D2001-1021 (October 12, 2001); A & F Trademark Inc. v. Justin Jorgensen, WIPO Case No. D2001-0900 (September 19, 2001); Vivendi Universal v. Jay David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2001-1121 (November 7, 2001).
20. Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (January 25, 2001).
21. Julie Brown v. Julie Brown Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1628(February 13, 2001).
22. Celine Dion v. Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1838 (February 13, 2001).
23. See Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., Case No. AF-0096 (March 16, 2000); Educational Testing Service v. Netkorea Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0087; Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (February 18, 2000); Bloomberg L.P. v. David Cohen, Case No. FA01020000096600 (February 19, 2001).
24. See DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Bargma, WIPO Case No. D2000-0022 (May 29, 2000); Cardservice International Inc. v. Webster R. McGee, 950 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); aff'd 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997). See also Green Products Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); British Telecommunications plc v. One In A Million Ltd., [1997] E.W.J. No. 1599 (H.C.), aff'd, [1998] 4 All E.R. 476 (C.A.); TCPIP Holding Company Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc. 244 F. 3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2001); Ford Motor Company v. Ford Financial Solutions Inc. 103 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (N.D. Iowa 2000); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Technologies L.L.C., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12857 (E.D.Mich. 2000).
25. See Morrison & Foerster L.L.P. v. Brian Wick and American Distributions System Inc., Case No. FA0003000094301 (April 17, 2000); N.C.P. Marketing Group v. Entredomains, Case No. D2000-0387 (July 5, 2000); Onu S.R.L. v. Online Sales, Case No. AF-0672 (February 16, 2001); Aspen Grove Inc. v. Aspen Grove, Case No. D2001-0798 (October 5, 2001).