The Complainant is Caceis Bank, France, represented by Gevers, Belgium.
The Respondent is Leonardes Blomfield, France.
The disputed domain name <caceis-corporate.com> is registered with NameCheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”).
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on September 23, 2019. On September 23, 2019, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On September 23, 2019, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on September 24, 2019, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on September 26, 2019.
The Center verified that the Complaint, together with the amended Complaint, satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on October 3, 2019. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was October 23, 2019. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on October 24, 2019.
The Center appointed Louis-Bernard Buchman as the sole panelist in this matter on November 4, 2019. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Complainant is a bank registered in France, which belongs to the Crédit Agricole banking group. It offers investor services to asset managers, banks, institutional and corporate clients, including execution, clearing, depositary and custody, fund administration, fund distribution, and other related services.
According to the Complainant, it is the European leader in asset servicing and one of the major players worldwide.
The disputed domain name was initially registered in the name of a proxy service. The identity of the Respondent was disclosed by the Registrar in response to the Center’s request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name.
The Complainant has submitted forensic evidence that the disputed domain name, which redirected to the Complainant’s website, has been reported four times to have been used for phishing activity.
The Complainant or CACEIS S.A. (a group affiliate) owns several registered trademarks containing the term CACEIS, or slight variations thereof.
The registrations include, inter alia, the European Union trademark No 4643573, registered on February 26, 2008, and the European Union trademark No 5770391, registered on February 28, 2008 (together referred to hereinafter as: “the Mark”).
The Complainant owns the <caceis.com> domain name, which resolves to its main website.
The disputed domain name <caceis-corporate.com> was created on September 2, 2019.
(i) The Complainant submits that the disputed domain name reproduces the Mark, in which the Complainant has rights, and is confusingly similar to the Mark insofar as the disputed domain name, caceis-corporate.com>, contains the distinctive element “caceis” in its entirety, and that the addition of the descriptive element “corporate” is not capable of dispelling the confusing similarity.
(ii) The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name. Furthermore, the Complainant contends that it never authorized the Respondent to use the Mark in any manner and that the Respondent has never had any affiliation with the Complainant.
(iii) The Complainant submits that the Respondent has registered the disputed domain name in bad faith. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent had knowledge of the Mark when registering the disputed domain name.
(iv) The Complainant submits that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.
(v) The Complainant requests that the disputed domain name be transferred to the Complainant.
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant’s contentions.
As aforementioned, no Response was received from the Respondent.
Under the Rules, paragraphs 5(f) and 14(a), the effect of a default by the Respondent is that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the Panel shall proceed to a decision on the basis of the Complaint.
Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, it is the Complainant’s burden to establish that all three of the required criteria for a transfer of the disputed domain name have been met, even in the event of a default.
Under paragraph 14(b) of the Rules, the Panel is empowered to draw such inferences from the Respondent’s default as it considers appropriate under the circumstances.
In this case, the Panel finds that as a result of the default, the Respondent has failed to rebut any of the reasonable factual assertions that are made and supported by evidence submitted by the Complainant. In particular, by defaulting and failing to respond, the Respondent has failed to offer the Panel any of the types of evidence set forth in paragraph 4(c) of the Policy or otherwise, from which the Panel might conclude that the Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, such as making legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name.
Moreover, as discussed below, the Respondent has failed to provide any exculpatory information or reasoning that might have led the Panel to question the Complainant’s arguments that the Respondent has acted in bad faith.
In comparing the Mark with the disputed domain name <caceis-corporate.com>, it is evident that the latter consists of the Mark, followed by a hyphen and the word “corporate” and by the generic Top-Level Domain (“gTLD”) “.com”.
It is well established that a gTLD does not generally affect the assessment of a domain name for the purpose of determining identity or confusingly similarity.
The Panel finds that the disputed domain name <caceis-corporate.com> is confusingly similar to the Mark, which is incorporated in its entirety, and that the addition of the “corporate” element in the disputed domain name does not dispel the confusing similarity.
Thus, the Complainant has satisfied the requirement of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
Although a complainant bears the ultimate burden of establishing all three elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, UDRP panels have recognized that with regard to paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, this could result in the often impossible task of proving a negative proposition, requiring information that is primarily, if not exclusively, within the knowledge of a respondent.
Thus, the consensus view of UDRP panels is that paragraph 4(c) of the Policy shifts the burden of production of evidence to the respondent to come forward with evidence of rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, once the complainant has made a prima facie showing, as the Panel believes the Complainant has made in this case. See Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0270.
As previously noted, the Respondent offered no reason for selecting the disputed domain name. There is no evidence that the Respondent is known by the disputed domain name or uses (or has made bona fide preparations to use) the disputed domain name in a business.
The disputed domain name redirects the public to the Complainant’s website.
No information is provided on what rights or legitimate interests the Respondent may have in the disputed domain name.
To counter any notion that the Respondent has such rights or legitimate interests, the Complainant has argued that the Respondent (i) has no affiliation with the Complainant and (ii) received no authorization from the Complainant to register or use the disputed domain name.
In the circumstances, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has established the requirement of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy with respect to the disputed domain name.
As noted above, the Respondent has failed to provide any exculpatory information or persuasive reasoning that might have led the Panel to question the Complainant’s arguments that the Respondent acted in bad faith by creating confusion to the detriment of the Complainant by registering the disputed domain name confusingly similar to the Mark.
It is established in prior UDRP decisions that where the respondent knew or should have known of a trademark prior to registering the disputed domain name, such conduct may be, in certain circumstances, sufficient evidence of bad faith registration and use. See Weetabix Limited v. Mr. J. Clarke, WIPO Case No. D2001-0775.
In this case, given that the disputed domain name redirected to the website of the Complainant, the Panel finds that it is impossible to believe that the Respondent chose to register the disputed domain name randomly with no knowledge of the Mark. See Barney’s Inc. v. BNY Bulletin Board, WIPO Case No. D2000-0059; Kate Spade, LLC v. Darmstadter Designs, WIPO Case No. D2001-1384, citing Cellular One Group v. Paul Brien, WIPO Case No. D2000-0028; and SembCorp Industries Limited v. Hu Huan Xin, WIPO Case No. D2001-1092.
The Panel finds it is not possible to imagine any plausible future active use of the disputed domain name that would not be illegitimate, considering the specificity of the Complainant’s activity. In addition, the Panel notes that many UDRP panels have held that bad faith use of a domain name by a respondent may also result from the fact its good faith use is in no way plausible (see Audi AG v. Hans Wolf, WIPO Case No. D2001-0148), considering the specificity of the activity.
Furthermore, the Panel notes that the Complainant has also argued and provided evidence that the disputed domain name has been used for phishing purposes, such behavior being considered as evidence of bad faith use (see WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 3.1.4).
The Panel also finds that using the disputed domain name to redirect the public to the official website of the Complainant, thus luring the public into believing that the disputed domain name is associated with the Complainant and is legitimate, is evidence of bad faith use. Prior UDRP panels have held that by retaining control over the redirection, which it could modify at any time, the respondent creates a real or latent threat to the complainant, which is further evidence of bad faith registration and use (see WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.1.4).
In this case, the Respondent has taken active steps to hide his identity and has submitted no evidence of any good faith use of the disputed domain name. The Panel also notes that although using a proxy service to hide the identity of the registrant is not per se conclusive of bad faith registration and use (see Trinity Mirror Plc and MGN Ltd. v. Piranha Holdings, WIPO Case No. D2008-0004), the fact that the Respondent used a proxy service to hide his identity and contact details prevented the Complainant from contacting him. Prior UDRP panels have held that deliberate concealment of identity and contact information may in certain circumstances be indicative of registration in bad faith (see TTT Moneycorp Limited v. Diverse Communications, WIPO Case No. D2001-0725, and Schering Corporation v. Name Redacted, WIPO Case No. D2012-0729).
Finally, some UDRP panels have held that in certain circumstances, registrants of domain names have an affirmative duty to abstain from registering and using a domain name which is either identical or confusingly similar to a prior trademark held by others and that contravening that duty may constitute bad faith. See Policy, paragraph 2(b); Nike, Inc. v. B. B. de Boer, WIPO Case No. D2000-1397; Nuplex Industries Limited v. Nuplex, WIPO Case No. D2007-0078; Mobile Communication Service Inc. v. WebReg, RN, WIPO Case No. D2005-1304; BOUYGUES v. Chengzhang, Lu Ciagao, WIPO Case No. D2007-1325; Media General Communications, Inc. v. Rarenames, WebReg, WIPO Case No. D2006-0964; and mVisible Technologies, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Systems, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-1141.
The Panel concludes in the light of all these circumstances that the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name constitute bad faith, and that the requirement of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy is also satisfied in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name <caceis-corporate.com> be transferred to the Complainant.
Louis-Bernard Buchman
Sole Panelist
Date: November 18, 2019