



Art. 12 of Beijing Treaty – transfer of the rights and remuneration

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I. Art. 12 (1) of Beijing Treaty – transfer of the rights

art 12 (1) of BT transfer of the rights - **Effect of compromise**:

no **mandatory rebuttable presumption** of transfer of all exclusive rights of authorization of the performer to the producer of audiovisual fixation (alternative E – Basic Proposal I 2000) or similar mechanisms (as alternative F) **as new basic, biding international standard**

but

also no Alternative H – lack of provisions on this issue in the BT

Tension: centralizing all exclusive rights of performs for worldwide exploitation in hands of film producers vs. confirmation of existing rules (no distruption to national laws by international rules limited to one sector)





I. Art. 12 (1) of Beijing Treaty – transfer of the rights

- Result: 1. flexible and facultative provision guaranteeing Parties of BT very wide scope of freedom in implementation: from no provisions option to different options mentioned in art. 12 (1) BT sometimes no changes in national legislation needed (UE example) all the provisions of art. 12 only empower Parties to regulate do not oblige them to do so;
 - 2. even more flexability added statutory provisions on the transfer of the rights maybe subject to any contract to the contrary;
 - 3. list of possible legal instruments from art 12 (1) BT(ownership of film producer, excercises of exclusive rights, legal presumption of transfer) does not exclude other legal instruments (f.ex. irrebuttable presumption France) that national laws may recognize in order to deal with transfer of performer's rights (WIPO doc SCCR/22/18) but art 12 (1) only covers situation when producer derives their rights from the performer;





I. Art. 12 (1) of Beijing Treaty – transfer of the rights

Result: 4. provision should apply to the exclusive, specifically listed in the treaty, economic rights of authorization (neither to moral nor – in Polish opinion - to the right of equitable remuneration under 12 (3) BT.

 only them are neccesary to guarantee the producer - with full legal security - possibility to conclude licensing agreements in order to exploit the audivisual fixation.



I. Art. 12 (2) of Beijing Treaty – transfer of the rights



> Art. 12 (2) and (3) BT added in favour of performers (at the end is "their" Treaty)

1. art 12 (2) – **consent or contract** in which performer consented to the fixation of his performance in audiovisual fixation must be in **writing** and **signed** by both parties/ their authorized representatives (important when want to analyse the legal consequences of the contract, rebutt the presumption from 12 (1) BT or set differently the scope of it) – similar solution to art. 6 UE rental rights directive;

in national legislation countries may add other prerequisites (for ex. neccessary for validity of the contract) which transfers the exclusive rights to the producer.



II. Art. 12 (3) of Beijing Treaty – remuneration



Art. 12 (3) – **possible** (next "may" provision) – **right of the performer** to get royalties of equitable remuneration for any use of the performance (form of compensation for the performer for the loss of exclusive rights);

such a right is "independent of the transfer of exclusive rights" – no matter what are national provision on such a "transfer" (even where is legal presumption of the ownership of the rights by the producer – so no "transfer" in the sense of existence of agreement transfering the rights) still such royalties/ remuneration for performer may be regulated by national law or by contractual agreements.





II. Art. 12 (3) of Beijing Treaty – remuneration

Result:

- 1. flexibility for the Parties of BT in art. 12 (3) BT- different legislative (not neccessary direct statutory provision, also binding rules on the contract law imposed by law) or contractual measures allowed to guarantee performers ongoing payments;
- 2. next flexibility any kind of payment for the use of performance possible:
- **royalties** (usually claimed from the producers and based on their gross revenue so rather agreed on conctractually basis)
- **equitable remuneration** (which is generally paid by the users and can be made more effective when subject to mandatory collective management – similar solution to art. 4 of UE Rental Directive).

"equitable" – so taking into account peformers's contribution to the final product and extent of use made therof



II. Art. 12 (3) of Beijing Treaty – remuneration



Second option – also from Polish experience - may be extremely helpful as performers do not have a strong bargaining position, which will grant them comparable benefits to those that others may derive from collective agreements and/or individual negotiation.





III. General issues open for interpretation:

1. Legal nature of right of the performer under art. 12 (3) BT

Some arguments, why it is not a limitation of the exclusive right:

* right to get equitable remuneration is outside the sphere of exclusive rights at all – it has additional character to exclusive rights (may exist but is not neccessary) – compare with facultative character of art. 12 (3) BT;

* it is based on the statute (argument valid, where such right is regulated by the statute – it scope can be different than the scope of exclusive rights – example Poland – exclusive rights for making available for performers and no equitable remuneration after transfer of rights for that field of exploitation).



III. General issues open for interpretation:

2. National treatment in the context of art. 12 (3) BT – crucial from political perspective – "pay or not to pay – this is a question";

Some arguments, why no national treatment in this instance:

* statutory rules of remuneration are not a "treatment" in the sense of art. 4 BT – it only covers minumum rights in the form of exclusive rights under BT (art. 7 – 11 BT) and remuneration rights namely provided in art. 4 of BT - so right of remuneration under art. 11 (2) BT;

* such a "treatment" do not cover any rights that may and not need to be provided under BT.

In absence of "national treatment": statutory rules of private international law regarding contracts should be applied (leaving that to contract rules dangerous due to weaker bargining power of performers).







Thank you for your attention

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