[G.R. No.
108946. January 28, 1999.]
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS,
INC., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, GABRIEL
ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY FRANCISCO,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
This is a
petition for certiorari. Petitioners seek to annul the resolution of the
Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1992, in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27854,
entitled "Gabriel Zosa, et al. v. City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Francisco Joaquin, Jr.," and its resolution, dated December 3, 1992,
denying petitioner Joaquin's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner BJ
Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright No.
M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired
from 1970 to 1977.
On June 28, 1973,
petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its
certificate of copyright specifying the show's format and style of
presentation.
On July 14, 1991,
while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of
BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which was produced
by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private
respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of IXL, informing
Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me and demanding that IXL
discontinue airing It's a Date.
In a letter,
dated July 19, 1991, private respondent Zosa apologized to petitioner Joaquin
and requested a meeting to discuss a possible settlement. IXL, however,
continued airing It's a Date, prompting petitioner Joaquin to send a
second letter on July 25, 1991 in which he reiterated his demand and warned
that, if IXL did not comply, he would endorse the matter to his attorneys for
proper legal action.
Meanwhile,
private respondent Zosa sought to register IXL's copyright to the first episode
of It's a Date for which it was issued by the National Library a
certificate of copyright on August 14, 1991.
Upon complaint by
petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed
against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN Channel
9, namely, William Esposo, Felipe Medina, and Casey Francisco, in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-27854
and assigned to Branch 104 thereof. However, private respondent Zosa sought a
review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor before the Department
of Justice.
On August 12,
1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant
City Prosecutor's findings and directed him to move for the dismissal of the
case against private respondents.
Petitioner
Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
respondent Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that:
1.
The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he invoked non-presentation of the master tape as
being fatal to the existence of probable cause to prove infringement, despite
the fact that private respondents never raised the same as a controverted
issue.
2. The public respondent gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he arrogated unto himself the
determination of what is copyrightable — an issue which is exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court to assess in a proper proceeding.
Both public and
private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish the existence
of probable cause due to their failure to present the copyrighted master
videotape of Rhoda and Me. They contend that petitioner BJPI's copyright
covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Me and that the formats or
concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright protection under P.
D. No. 49.
Non-Assignment of Error
Petitioners claim
that their failure to submit the copyrighted master videotape of the television
show Rhoda and Me was not raised in issue by private respondents during
the preliminary investigation and, therefore, it was error for the Secretary of
Justice to reverse the investigating prosecutor's finding of probable cause on
this ground.
A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state
prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal
actions. He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Rule 112, §4 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.
— If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify
under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, that the accused was informed of the complaint and of
the evidence submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend dismissal of the
complaint.
In either case, he shall forward the records of
the case to the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor within five
(5) days from his resolution. The latter shall take appropriate action thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, immediately informing the parties of
said action.
No complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
Where the investigating assistant fiscal
recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor on the ground that a
probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding
information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or
state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party, the
Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation
or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information.
In reviewing
resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from
considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether
there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding
of probable cause and is not confined to the issues raised by the parties
during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject to
review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
Opinion of the Secretary of Justice
Petitioners
contend, however, that the determination of the question whether the format or
mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection is for the court, and
not the Secretary of Justice, to make. They assail the following portion of the
resolution of the respondent Secretary of Justice:
[T]he essence of copyright infringement is the
copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as defined and
enumerated in Section 2 of P.D. No. 49. Apart from the manner in
which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is, in
the opinion of this Office, a non-copyrightable material. Ideas,
concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within
the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as
provided in PD. No. 49. (Emphasis added.)
It is indeed true
that the question whether the format or mechanics of petitioners' television
show is entitled to copyright protection is a legal question for the court to
make. This does not, however, preclude respondent Secretary of Justice from
making a preliminary determination of this question in resolving whether there
is probable cause for filing the case in court. In doing so in this case, he
did not commit any grave error.
Presentation of Master Tape
Petitioners claim
that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ruling
that the master videotape should have been presented in order to determine
whether there was probable cause for copyright infringement. They contend that 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on which respondent
Secretary of Justice relied in reversing the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, is inapplicable to the case at bar because in the present case, the
parties presented sufficient evidence which clearly establish "linkages
between the copyrighted show 'Rhoda and Me' and the infringing TV show 'It's
a Date.'"
The case of 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation involved raids conducted on various videotape
outlets allegedly selling or renting out "pirated" videotapes. The
trial court found that the affidavits of NBI agents, given in support of the
application for the search warrant, were insufficient without the master tape.
Accordingly, the trial court lifted the search warrants it had previously
issued against the defendants. On petition for review, this Court sustained the
action of the trial court and ruled:
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative
of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied
tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was
directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the
similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to
the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video
tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
This ruling was qualified in the later case of Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals in which it was held:
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in
said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of
the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be
understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of
probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to
the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An
objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no
other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping
and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. . .
.
In the case at
bar, during the preliminary investigation, petitioners and private respondents
presented written descriptions of the formats of their respective televisions
shows, on the basis of which the investigating prosecutor ruled:
As may [be] gleaned from the evidence on
record, the substance of the television productions complainant's "RHODA
AND ME" and Zosa's "IT'S A DATE" is that two matches are made
between a male and a female, both single, and the two couples are treated to a
night or two of dining and/or dancing at the expense of the show. The major
concepts of both shows is the same. Any difference appear mere variations of
the major concepts.
That there is an infringement on the copyright of the show "RHODA AND ME" both in content and in the execution of the video presentation are established because respondent's "IT'S A DATE" is practically an exact copy of complainant's "RHODA AND ME" because of substantial similarities as follows, to wit:
|
|
|
|
|
"RHODA AND ME" |
"IT'S A DATE" |
|
||
|
|
|
||
Set 1 |
Set 1 |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
a. |
Unmarried participant |
a. |
same |
|
|
of one gender (searcher) |
|
|
|
|
appears on one side of a |
|
|
|
|
divider, while three (3) |
|
|
|
|
unmarried participants |
|
|
|
|
of the other gender are |
|
|
|
|
on the other side of the |
|
|
|
|
divider. This arrangement |
|
|
|
|
is done to ensure |
|
|
|
|
that the searcher does |
|
|
|
|
not see the searchees. |
|
|
|
b. |
Searcher asks a question |
b. |
same |
|
|
to be answered by each of |
|
|
|
|
the searchees. The purpose |
|
|
|
|
is to determine who among |
|
|
|
|
the searchees is the most |
|
|
|
|
compatible with the searcher. |
|
|
|
c. |
Searcher speculates on the |
c. |
same |
|
|
match to the searchee. |
|
|
|
d. |
Selection is made by the |
d. |
Selection is |
|
|
use of compute (sic) methods, |
|
based on the |
|
|
or by the way questions are |
|
answer of the |
|
|
answered, or similar methods. |
|
Searchees. |
|
|
|
|
||
Set 2 |
Set 2 |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Same as above with the genders |
|
same |
|
|
of the searcher and searchees |
|
|
|
|
interchanged. |
|
|
|
Petitioners
assert that the format of Rhoda and Me is a product of ingenuity and
skill and is thus entitled to copyright protection. It is their position that
the presentation of a point-by-point comparison of the formats of the two shows
clearly demonstrates the nexus between the shows and hence establishes the
existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. Such being the case,
they did not have to produce the master tape.
To begin with,
the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No. 49,
otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, enumerates the
classes of work entitled to copyright protection, to wit:
Section 2. The rights granted by this
Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the
following classes of works:
(A) Books, including composite and
cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, and gazetteers;
(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and
newspapers;
(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses,
dissertations prepared for oral delivery;
(D) Letters;
(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical
compositions; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb shows, the acting
form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise;
(F) Musical compositions, with or without
words;
(G) Works of drawing, painting,
architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, and other works of art; models
or designs for works of art;
(H) Reproductions of a work of art;
(I) Original ornamental designs or models
for articles of manufacture, whether or not patentable, and other works of
applied art;
(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;
(K) Drawings or plastic works of a
scientific or technical character;
(L) Photographic works and works produced
by a process analogous to photography; lantern slides;
(M) Cinematographic works and works
produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making
audio-visual recordings;
(N) Computer programs;
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations
advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;
(P) Dramatizations, translations,
adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other alterations of literary,
musical or artistic works or of works of the Philippine government as herein
defined, which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 of this Decree.
(Q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or
artistic works or of works referred to in Section 9 of this Decree which by
reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute
intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in accordance with
Section 8 of this Decree.
(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific
and artistic works.
This provision is substantially the same as §172 of the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). The
format or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of
protected works in §2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the protection
afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is
purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the
statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a
statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be
obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and
on terms and conditions specified in the statute.
Since . . . copyright in published works is
purely a statutory creation, a copyright may be obtained only for a work
falling within the statutory enumeration or description.
Regardless of the historical viewpoint, it is
authoritatively settled in the United States that there is no copyright except
that which is both created and secured by act of Congress . . .
P.D. No. 49, §2, in
enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to
concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES provides:
SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter.
— Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall
extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or operation,
concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed,
explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the day and other
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information; or
any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal nature, as well as
any official translation thereof.
What then is the
subject matter of petitioners' copyright? This Court is of the opinion that
petitioner BJPI's copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda
and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, §2(M), to wit:
Cinematographic works and works produced by a
process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual
recordings;
The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of
its dating game show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of
petitioner BJPI's copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have the
opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.
Mere description
by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient;
the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the
determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by
respondent Secretary of Justice:
A television show includes more than mere words
can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video
and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely
describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.