Introduction
Sustained differences in economic growth between countries have led to vast differences in income per capita. When Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776, the ratio of the highest to lowest income per capita was around 7 to 1. Today, this ratio is more than 250 to 1!
While the gap between the poorest and richest countries has grown overall, the growth experience of initially poor economies has been mixed. Up until around 1990, poorer countries, taken together, did not grow any faster than richer countries. Economists characterized this development performance as a continued process of divergence.
Despite this better news, it is important to realize that what holds true for poorer economies as a whole does not necessarily hold true for all such economies. Already by the 1970s and 1980s, certain less developed countries – notably, the Republic of Korea – had achieved economic convergence with developed economies. Conversely, despite there being a general convergence trend over the last three decades, a considerable number of poorer economies – including many of the least developed countries – have struggled to generate growth and have continued to fall behind. Across world regions, Asian economies – primarily those in East and South Asia – have, overall, seen a stronger growth performance than economies in Africa and Latin America. Yet even within different regions, the growth experience of the different economies has varied over time.
Economists have sought to explain such wide variations in development outcomes for as long as they have been observed. Robert Solow famously argued that long-run economic growth could only be achieved through sustained technological development.
In principle, technological knowledge can be easily shared and replicated, but in practice it does not flow seamlessly across space.
What explains their relative success and what can others learn from their experiences?
These questions are at the heart of this report. Drawing on new thinking in economic research, the report introduces the concept of economic complexity, which provides a framework for understanding how economies accumulate, diversify and apply knowledge. This task is performed in Section 2 of this chapter. Based on this understanding, Section 3 reviews what policymakers can do to promote industrial growth and reviews how both the practice and the intellectual thought behind so-called industrial policy have evolved over the past few decades. Section 4 offers concluding thoughts by highlighting the emergence of a new era of industrial policies.
The remainder of this report delves deeper into the industrial development process. Mirroring the notion of economic complexity, Chapter 2 employs data on trade, scientific publications and patents to develop indicators of so-called innovation complexity. Chapters 3 to 5, in turn, offer insights into successful industrial development approaches through three case studies: agricultural technology, motorcycles and videogames.
Understanding relatedness and economic complexity
Technology represents the knowledge that we harness to reshape our physical and social environments. It has grown tremendously over the past few centuries, as demonstrated by the ever increasing volume of books, scientific papers and patents. Yet our individual capacity to comprehend it remains constrained. Hence, we increasingly become specialized as individuals and distribute knowledge to counterparts. Over time, this knowledge ends up in tools, machines and equipment – so-called embodied knowledge. In addition, we codify what we know and convert it into forms that can be shared through documentation, standardization and classification – so-called codified knowledge. Yet a large part of our knowledge is harder to codify; instead, it remains tacit.
Tacit knowledge is “stuck” in brains and does not easily move across the world. Even codified knowledge does not flow seamlessly from one individual to another, because it requires prior knowledge to absorb. As a result, knowledge becomes concentrated in certain places. In 2021, for instance, Germany exported 61.5 percent of the world’s stereoscopic microscopes and the United States of America (US) 60.4 percent of the world’s aircraft launching gear (Figure 1.1). Firms and workers in those industries are highly specialized and cannot easily switch from producing microscopes to aircraft gear or vice versa.
This concentration and specialization of tacit knowledge can also be observed within industries. For instance, companies that make jet engines typically do not produce other aircraft parts. To put all the parts of an aircraft together, somebody must think about the design of each part and how they will come together. Hence, the growth of knowledge at the product level requires an increase in the division of labor at the level of the individual.
The game of Scrabble as a metaphor
In this metaphor,
Continuing the metaphor, we can think of places as collections of words and letters and products as collections of letters. A place – whether a city, province or country – can be characterized by the letters it has, whereas a product can be characterized by the letters it requires.
Economic researchers have formalized these logical statements about the world and have tested them empirically.
Source: Harvard Growth Lab (2023); an interactive version is available at https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu.
Each economy occupies its own product space. In order to diversify into new products, a country needs to find ways to reach other parts of the product space. And research has shown that diversification favors activities that are close together – known as the principle of relatedness.
Further implications of the Scrabble metaphor
The Scrabble metaphor has further implications for industrial development. First, the more letters one has, the more words one can put together. The diversity of letters thus leads to a diversity of words. Second, the longer the word, the harder it is to make it. If one assumes that there is some distribution of letters among places, the longer the word, the fewer the places that can make it. We call the number of places that can make a product the ubiquity of the product. A place that has a lot of letters should be more diversified and specialized in less ubiquitous products. And by the same token, less ubiquitous products should be made in more diversified places. Accordingly, the term economic complexity seeks to capture the knowledge residing in an economy, as it is expressed in the diversity and ubiquity of the products it produces. Economic researchers have translated this concept into a formal economic complexity index that captures how diversified and ubiquitous an economy’s export basket is.
The economic complexity index correlates with economic output and income per capita. Poor countries have few letters, whereas rich countries have a lot of letters. More importantly, if – relative to other countries with the same GDP or income per capita – a country has fewer letters, it tends to grow more slowly. In some sense, the space of letters is more fundamental to growth prospects than the current income level. A greater endowment with letters enables economies to diversify more easily and especially into products that are less ubiquitous. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
The concept of economic complexity allows for a richer understanding of the economic growth process that emphasizes different dimensions of knowledge and how distributive knowledge needs to come together in order to make things. To sustain growth, countries need to move to new and more complex industries, while building on relevant local capabilities.
A key question therefore is how can a country acquire new letters to make new words and diversify into new activities, particularly toward the denser part of the product space, where more complex products are located. The country would need the knowledge to make such jumps. According to the economic complexity view, the key to economic development is productive knowledge. Such knowledge is distributed in different individuals’ heads, tools and materials, and the process of economic growth entails the accumulation and expression of this knowledge in more goods. In the Scrabble world, this corresponds to more letters, more words and longer words. Development thus requires greater specialization at the level of individuals, which leads to greater diversification at the level of companies and industries.
One implication of this theory is that the tacit and complex knowledge embedded in specialized individuals is crucial for diversification. Due to its tacit and complex nature, such knowledge does not move freely across the world. Hence, countries may lack the knowledge to make jumps into new activities. How can they possibly overcome this barrier?
Diversification is a chicken-and-egg problem. For a place to diversify into new activities, it must learn to do things that it could not do in the past. But how does a place begin to make things if it does not know how they are made? For example, how does one become an experienced watchmaker in a place that does not make watches? The greater the number of missing letters, the more challenging it will be to diversify.
Countries generally need to benefit from a high level of basic skills to be able to absorb more complex and specialized capabilities from elsewhere.
The complexity framework developed here is in line with the criticism by economists – notably Benjamin F. Jones – about how human capital stock is accounted for in studies of economic growth.
How then can the challenge of missing letters be overcome? One way is the presence of major organizations with diversified portfolios, which allows for internal diffusion and redeployment of capabilities. Particularly relevant here are those organizations with substantial resources – such as corporate conglomerates – that can re-deploy existing workers and even whole teams to new and related activities. Famous examples of such internal diversification are the keiretsu in Japan and the chaebols in the Republic of Korea. Research has shown how these organizations propelled diversification into new technological activities in these two economies.
Labor mobility leading to knowledge transfer
Worker migration is another way of enabling diversification.
Pioneer plants also tend to drive the structural transformation of economies. Research has found that the greatest diversification steps are taken by entrepreneurs and existing firms from elsewhere that set up new plants in regions. They foster a process of knowledge diffusion across regions. During a period of 17 years of structural transformation in regions within Sweden, it is those pioneers that are shown most likely to survive and thrive.
Hence, for countries and regions to achieve structural transformation, it may be important to attract companies and workers from elsewhere. Economist AnnaLee Saxenian calls these workers the New Argonauts. She documents how foreign-born, highly skilled workers who have ventured back and forth between Silicon Valley and their home countries infused the latter with new knowledge.
One driving force for labor mobility is foreign direct investment (FDI). When companies invest abroad, they often send experienced workers to their subsidiaries and transfer skills to local employees through formal training and mentoring. FDI can thus be a key steppingstone to acquiring new letters. One study, for example, found that when companies set up foreign R&D facilities in a particular region, that region sees subsequent growth in patenting activities.
Diaspora networks can be another important channel of knowledge diffusion. They enable countries to tap into the knowledge of natives living abroad. For example, studies have traced the origins and growth of the information technology industries in China, India and Israel back to professional connections between domestic engineers, on the one hand, and diaspora engineers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, on the other.
These various mechanisms focus on moving brains rather than moving knowledge across brains. As discussed above, the tacitness of knowledge makes the latter much harder to accomplish. One way it can still work is through business travel. Despite modern communication technology, in-person travel remains an important feature of global business activity. One study found that business travel networks predict which new economic activities will develop in a country and, inversely, which old activities will decline.
The acquisition and accumulation of specialized knowledge usually result from market forces, with individuals and businesses identifying opportunities to maximize wages and profits. However, the diverse outcomes in industrial development observed across different parts of the world and over time indicate that the learning process enabling industrial diversification is not automatic. This raises the question of what preconditions need to be in place for successful learning to occur and, in particular, which public policies favor such success? We turn to this question next.
Policies to promote industrial development
From a broad perspective, a wide range of preconditions and policies matter for industrial development. For instance, overall macroeconomic stability, a functioning legal system, an effective educational system, and a financial system that efficiently turns savings into investment are all important. The complexity framework just discussed also highlights the importance of labor mobility, particularly openness to skilled immigration.
No doubt it is possible to point at countries that did not fully meet all the above conditions and yet still experienced industrial diversification. In addition, successful industrial development can be a self-reinforcing process, whereby initial success and the resultant economic growth promote the preconditions for subsequent success. Still, unfavorable overall preconditions in the above-listed areas will, on balance, hinder industrial development prospects.
Looking at it more narrowly, governments have long implemented policies aimed at directly promoting industrial diversification. The array of policy instruments employed for this purpose has significantly evolved over the past half-century. Traditionally, so-called industrial policy has been associated with a range of policy measures – notably, import tariffs, subsidies and subsidized loans – targeted at a limited set of industries.
An explicit or implicit aspect of these industrial policies was the selection of winners – the belief that certain industries held more promise for future development prospects compared to others. Starting in the 1950s, industrial policy centered on import substitution strategies, with many developing economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America pursuing such strategies.
The track record of import substitution is mixed, and in the 1990s many economists turned against it. While a theoretical case for import substitution exists, there were increasing doubts whether governments can reliably predict which industries hold the greatest promise. In addition, the acquisition of productive knowledge often proved more formidable than anticipated and perpetual infancy led to enduring import protection.
The disenchantment with import substitution gave rise to a new industry policy paradigm: export-led growth. The impetus behind this strategy was the success observed in certain East Asian economies, most notably Japan, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, SAR and Singapore, collectively recognized as the East Asian miracle. These economies experienced simultaneous industrial diversification and a significant expansion of their export activities. This led to the idea that active engagement in global commerce played a pivotal role in fostering knowledge acquisition and promoting industrial diversification. In principle, policies aimed at promoting export-led growth were intended to be neutral toward specific industries, avoiding the picking of winners. The emphasis was on flexible exchange rates, diminishing import protection, and, broadly, eliminating distortions in market incentives.
Many governments still subscribe to the export-led growth paradigm. However, economists' perspectives on its likelihood of success have significantly evolved. The outcomes of initial export-led growth policies exhibit a mixed track record. Despite the notable East Asian success story, many developing economies that adopted these policies did not experience substantial industrial growth.
Economic research has also raised doubts about whether the East Asian model of export-led growth, which is focused on manufacturing, can be effectively replicated in today's vastly transformed global economy.
A related question is whether all countries and regions share the same potential for industrial diversification. For example, advanced economies already specializing in highly complex activities may be in a better position to diversify into other highly complex activities, whereas less developed economies will only be able to diversify into less complex activities.
Considering the insufficiency of the export-led growth paradigm, how has thinking on industrial policy evolved over the past two decades? And does the concept of economic complexity help in setting priorities for industrial policy? While a full review of the rich research on industrial policy is beyond the scope of this chapter, the remainder of this section focuses on two prevalent lines of thought that have defined more recent approaches to industrial policy: harnessing science, technology and innovation for industrial development, and effectively devising industrial policy.
Harnessing science, technology and innovation for industrial development
A country's science, technology and innovation (STI) system comprises all entities engaged in the creation and dissemination of knowledge, as well as the interactions between them. These entities include universities, training institutes, research organizations, regulatory institutions and companies, which can be publicly or privately owned and can operate on either a for-profit or non-profit basis.
Within the economic complexity framework, an STI system shapes the set of letters available in a place and, in turn, the number of words – or products – it can produce. While productive knowledge ultimately resides in the brains of skilled workers, these workers are often trained at local universities. In addition, when innovating, companies frequently collaborate with scientific organizations, drawing in expertise not available in-house. Scientific organizations – while seeking the advancement of scientific knowledge – are often expressly tasked to address the technological needs of the local economy, though some do so more successfully than others.
Public policies and funding play a crucial role in sustaining an STI system that supports industrial development. Markets left to themselves would systemically underinvest in generating and diffusing knowledge. This is most evident for scientific research that does not have any immediate industrial application, but which provides the foundation for future innovations. Yet even where there are prospects for industrial applications, private markets may shun them. Technology may still be incipient, with a high risk of failure and uncertain commercial viability. There are numerous examples of technological advances initially benefiting from public funding that spawned entirely new industries, such as the pharmaceutical innovations developed during the Second World War, the internet and self-driving cars.
Even when companies are willing to bear the risk of investing in innovation, economists contend that they often tend to underinvest compared to what is socially desirable, for two key reasons. First, companies may find it difficult to appropriate the returns on their innovations if others can readily copy them. This is why governments protect patents and other forms of intellectual property (IP), which offer companies timebound exclusive rights on their inventive and creative outputs. Second, even when companies are able to profit from their innovations, the private return on innovation is often substantially below its social return.
An STI system is not only important in fostering innovation that prompts the commercialization of technology that is new to the world. It can also be instrumental in enabling economies to absorb and adapt knowledge generated elsewhere. In fact, this will be the primary role of STI systems in developing economies, where industries do not operate at the world’s technology frontier. For example, in many developing economies, universities and research institutes have led the adaptation of new plant varieties and farming technologies to local conditions. Studies have also documented the crucial role that publicly-funded research organizations played at the early stages of India’s pharmaceutical industry and the Republic of Korea’s semiconductor industry.
Harnessing STI systems for development is a matter of mobilizing government revenue to fund universities and public research organizations and providing R&D support to companies. However, it is also a matter of providing policy incentives, building linkages within the STI system and offering advice. For instance, many universities have developed frameworks for transferring technology developed in academic labs to companies. These frameworks seek to promote such transfers, while also recognizing that the commercial deployment of university technology often requires substantial follow-on investment by companies. Managing IP rights is a critical component of such technology transfer frameworks.
In addition, STI institutions are important in matching the supply and demand for technology. Unlike many goods and services traded in the marketplace, technology is highly differentiated. Companies may not be aware of existing solutions to the technological challenges they face, while academic researchers may be insufficiently informed about the technological needs of companies. There is thus a role for platforms and industry fairs that can overcome such informational divides. Similarly, many IP offices provide so-called technology landscapes to industry stakeholders, based on the patents filed in different technology fields worldwide (Box 1.1).
Individuals, companies, universities and other entities applying for patent protection must disclose their inventions to IP offices, who evaluate whether these inventions meet the eligibility criteria for patentability. IP offices eventually publish patent applications, adding to an ever-growing patent literature that provides a wealth of information on innovation across all fields of technology. Many companies frequently consult patent literature in order to study the latest technological trends and learn about the innovative activities of their competitors.
Patent documents are a good example of codified knowledge that is theoretically accessible to anyone, but which in practice requires specialized skills in order to understand and use. To facilitate insights that emerge from the patent literature, many IP offices around the world regularly publish so-called patent landscapes. These landscapes typically focus on one or a selected group of technologies. They provide a classification of relevant technologies, highlight areas of growth and decline, and pinpoint the main actors and locations of inventive activity. WIPO maintains a global repository of patent landscapes compiled by national and regional IP offices.
Companies without their own in-house patent analytics capabilities can draw on these freely available reports to inform their innovative activities, including whether to seek licenses for patented technologies. Patent landscapes can also provide useful information to policymakers, as they reflect the capabilities of local innovators and their position in the broader innovation landscape. For example, in its 2021 Innovation Strategy, the Government of the United Kingdom (UK) partly relied on the patent landscaping work of the UK Intellectual Property Office in order to identify seven technology families that provide a starting point for prioritizing investment.
Finally, through the STI system, governments can prioritize the development and diffusion of technologies that societies value highly but for which private incentives to innovate are insufficient. One example is public health. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of an agile innovation system to respond to the spread of infectious diseases. However, in non-pandemic times, companies have little incentive to invest in vaccine R&D, as there is no market to sell vaccines. Public support can compensate for the lack of market incentives. Similarly, STI policies can prioritize technologies that reduce carbon emissions and better manage climate adaptation – beyond what market incentives can provide.
Devising industrial policy
As pointed out above, one criticism leveled at early industrial policies was the uncertain ability of governments to predict which industrial activities held the greatest promise in a particular location. There are, indeed, numerous examples of disappointing results from initiatives to build, say, local biotech or semiconductor industries from the ground up.
Industrial policy interventions may serve different purposes. They may amplify existing capabilities and thus accelerate industrial diversification. Alternatively, they may aim to disrupt the natural path dependence process if existing capabilities constrain industrial growth.
One approach – adopted in the European Union (EU) since 2014 – is called smart specialization.
How successful has smart specialization been? It is difficult – and perhaps too early – to provide a definite answer. The first phase of implementation in EU countries suggests that it is feasible but challenging to design and implement smart specialization strategies. In many cases, it proved difficult to identify a relevant priority area. Moreover, translating identified priorities into specific goals and finally moving toward transformational roadmaps and activities requires supporting institutions, which often proved to be weak.
Assessing economic outcomes is complicated by the fact that smart specialization strategies entail numerous interventions over time with long-term objectives, which do not allow for straightforward “before” and “after” assessments.
A new era of industrial policies
In summary, economists have long held ambivalent views about the effectiveness of industrial policies. This arguably reflects the mixed historical record of industrial policies centered on import protection and subsidizing specific industries. Beneath this ambivalence, however, there arguably is a more widespread consensus on the types of policy intervention that promote industrial development. Most economists would endorse governments investing in an STI system that facilitates the acquisition and diffusion of new knowledge.
STI policies may not always fit neatly within narrow definitions of industrial policy, and they typically fall outside the purview of industrial development ministries. However, STI systems invariably shape industrial development and are usually designed with this purpose in mind. To be clear, STI policy choices still entail taking tough decisions. For example, which fields of scientific research should receive support? Which incipient technologies deserve funding and when should such funding be withdrawn? Market mechanisms provide few, if any, signals to inform such decisions.
Recent years have seen a revival of industrial policies, including in economies that have traditionally shunned them, such as the United States. This revival was not prompted by economists having gained new insights into their effectiveness. Rather, they emerged as a response to various new challenges faced by governments. One such challenge is climate change and the need to reduce carbon emissions. Prominently, the European Green Deal of 2020 and the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 provide incentives to companies and projects that promote the development and deployment of carbon-reducing technology. Another challenge is to address shortages of strategic goods in the face of global supply chain shocks – as happened during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Government of Japan has made subsidies available to companies to support the re-shoring of production from overseas locations.
The industrial policy instruments employed by governments in this new era vary widely. They range from tax breaks, production subsidies and R&D subsidies to trade and regulatory measures.
Nonetheless, and despite the difference in context, some of the choices in recent industrial policies reflect bets on which industrial activities will offer long-term benefits. For example, many governments around the world currently support the development of an indigenous battery industry, believing that batteries will be a critical input for electrical vehicles and, more generally, future mobility. However, economies of scale in the production of batteries may mean that production will only be efficient at a few locations. In addition, it is unclear whether hosting battery production will offer substantial spillover benefits to the local economy, or whether batteries will turn out to be a commoditized product that can be easily imported. Notwithstanding the strong imperative behind the new wave of industrial policies, evaluating the benefits and costs associated with different policy interventions will thus remain important.